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Potentially important reasons for why many studies have rejected the law of one price (LOP),
are that goods in different locations differ in attributes and that costs of local inputs are
important for prices. For many goods, transport costs are also likely to be high so that
arbitrage can not be expected to equalize prices. Much recent interest has focused on how
nominal price rigidities interact with deviations from LOP. By examining duty-free outlets,
where the same physical product is sold at the same location but in (at least) two different
currencies, we are able to provide a benchmark of the importance of deviations from LOP
where the "identical goods assumption" holds and there are no transport costs. We find that
the duty-free outlets allow deviations from LOP of up to 7-10 percent. Deviations below this
level can be very persistent and last up to a decade. Even after accounting for costs of
exchanging currency, there are periods with arbitrage opportunities. However, if exchange rate
movements bring prices further out of line then nominal prices are adjusted as to reduce the
deviations. Our findings are consistent with costly arbitrage and fixed costs of adjusting
nominal prices.
Keywords: law of one price, market segmentation, price discrimination, purchasing power
parity.
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Many empirical studies have rejected the law of one price. That prices of a good differ across
locations has been explained by differences in product attributes and costs of local inputs,
transport costs, trade barriers, and that buyers have imperfect information about prices in
different locations; see Penelopi K. Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter (1997) for a survey. We
examine the law of one price in situations where none of the mentioned reasons for its failure
can be invoked. It has also been suggested that deviations from the law of one price are a
consequence of rigid nominal prices and that different countries typically have different
currencies.We explore if this can contribute to our understanding of deviations from the law
of one price.
Our data is taken from three Scandinavian duty-free outlets where each product
(at the same location) has price tags in at least two currencies. Hence, a consumer has the
option to choose between several prices for the same identical good. In such a setting there is
a strong prior that the law of one price (LOP henceforward) holds well. However, the potential
for arbitrage will arise since nominal prices are not continuously adjusted while exchange
rates fluctuate daily.
Based on standard tests, we reject LOP at all duty-free outlets. Given that LOP
does not hold here, it is less surprising that many previous studies have found that prices of
VLPLODU products at GLIIHUHQW locations differ significantly. Nevertheless, the main conclusion
of the paper is that in this "natural experiment", LOP remains a useful guide to the behavior of
relative prices. As deviations become large, nominal prices are adjusted to reduce the
deviation from LOP, thereby limiting arbitrage opportunities. The patterns at the duty-free
outlets suggest that there is a band of inaction so that "small" deviations from LOP may
persist (for almost a decade in one case), but that large deviations quickly lead firms to adjust




To introduce the issues involved we begin with a brief discussion of the factors underlying
decisions by the duty-free outlets to adjust prices. We use Birka Line, with ferry operations
between Sweden and Finland, as our example. Birka Line sells an array of products imported
from different countries and until 1992 prices each product in its catalogue in both Swedish3
kronor (SEK) and Finnish markka (FIM). The prices on the shelves in the duty-free store are
the same as those in the catalogue. Printing a new catalogue involves at least some fixed cost
and therefore nominal prices will not change continuously. The decision to print a new
catalogue can be either time or state dependent. With a time dependent rule, prices are
renewed at a given frequency, whereas with a state dependent rule new prices are posted when
cost or demand conditions have changed sufficiently to motivate taking the cost of adjusting
price; see John B. Taylor (1999) for a discussion. For Birka Line the costs are affected by
exchange rates vis-à-vis producing countries and demand is affected by on shore excise taxes.
Inflation influences both demand and costs.
  Focus now on the problem of setting each product’s price in two currencies.
Given that products are available at the same location and time, and that Birka Line wishes to
minimize arbitrage opportunities, one would expect LOP to hold when a new catalogue is
printed.
1 Thus, the relative price should be adjusted to restore LOP once the SEK/FIM
exchange rate has moved sufficiently upward or downward.
 This begs the question of ZK\ the
firm offers consumers the option to choose between two rigid nominal prices. There are two
rationales. The first is that dual prices are a service to consumers who value a simple
comparison of the duty-free price in their own currency with prices at home. If this is the sole
motive for dual currency pricing, we expect LOP to hold after prices are adjusted. The second
reason is price discrimination. Demand for duty-free items is likely to differ because of
differences in income, tastes and onshore prices in the two countries. Under price
discrimination, new relative prices will again be set once the movement in the SEK/FIM
exchange rate has been sufficiently large, but LOP will not hold after adjustment.
  Both these rationales for dual pricing require that not all consumers engage in
arbitrage. There are two potential arbitrage costs - with different implications for price setting.
Firstly, individual consumers will typically have costs of exchanging currency. The relevance
of this will differ across consumers: some will carry both currencies, some will exchange on
board the ferry and others will use credit cards in which case the practices of the issuing bank
determine the transaction cost. We will return to a more thorough discussion of these costs;
for now note that there is no fixed charge associated with exchanging currency on the boats or
when using a credit card. Also, the consumer gets the same exchange rate regardless of
whether she exchanges SEK 6 or SEK 600. The equalizing pressure of arbitrage is therefore
independent of the price level of the good if this is the only cost of arbitrage. Secondly, there
may be costs associated with finding out the current exchange rate and making the price4
comparison. It is no more difficult to compare SEK 600 to FIM 400 than it is to compare SEK
6 to FIM 4, and since the potential gains are greater the more expensive the good is, we expect
lower percentage deviations from LOP on big-ticket items. Irrespective of the source of
arbitrage costs we conjecture that the greater the deviation from LOP, the larger the share of
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currency <. Throughout, we employ end-of-month exchange rates from International Financial
Statistics (IFS); in section III we discuss how these relate to the exchange rates that face
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We focus our analysis on Birka Line, where our data cover more than two
decades (1975-1998). After that we briefly discuss price setting at the ferry operator Viking
Line (1991-1997) and the airline SAS (1995-1998).
￿ All three duty-free outlets issue
catalogues with prices in several currencies. The prices of 18 products are used - primarily
well known international brands such as Marlboro cigarettes, Smirnoff vodka, and Chanel No.
5 perfume (see Appendix A for a full list of products). The revenues from duty-free sales are
very significant for the ferry lines (some 50 percent of total revenue for Viking Line) and
many passengers use the ferries primarily to purchase products that are heavily taxed in the
two countries.
A.%LUND/LQH
The first important observation is that Birka Line uses the same relative price for every
product in a given catalogue (save for tick-size effects of 1-2 percent on products with low
nominal prices). Hence, the persistence and magnitude of the deviation from LOP is5
independent of product characteristics. Figure 1 shows the nominal prices of Marlboro
cigarettes in SEK and FIM, the relative price (36(.3),0), and the exchange rate. If LOP holds,
the relative price equals the exchange rate. This is not what is observed in the figure, and
deviations from LOP are often quite persistent. During 1975-1998 Birka Line issued 26
catalogues, of which the first 20 listed prices in both SEK and FIM, and the last 6 only in
SEK. The timing of the catalogues can be inferred from the nominal price adjustments in
Figure 1 (there is no instance of a new catalogue without new nominal prices). The pattern of
price adjustment (e.g., the time between price adjustments and the size distribution of price
adjustments) at Birka Line is well in line with what is typically found in micro-data studies of
price rigidities (see Taylor, 1999).
3
Figure 1 about here
From Figure 1 it is clear that LOP is a useful way to think about the adjustment of relative
prices since over time the relative price tracks the exchange rate. Furthermore, it is clear that
the adjustment of the relative price can’t be fully described by a time dependent rule,
sometimes a relative price lasts long, sometimes it doesn't. Table 1 presents some descriptive
statistics on the price adjustments on Birka Line. In columns 2-4 we examine the predictions
outlined in Section I by comparing three types of months: no new catalogue (M=1), a new
catalogue but unchanged relative price (M=2), and finally months with a new catalogue and
new relative price (M=3). The product we use is Smirnoff vodka, but the results are virtually
identical for all other products.
4 To understand what preceded the decision to print a new
catalogue (with or without new relative prices), we denote by  [ 0 = = D  the percentage
movement in variable Z since the last event M=x. We also construct a contrafactual deviation
from LOP, denoted &'/23, as the percentage deviation from LOP that would result in month
t if nominal prices were held constant from month t-1.
5 Formally, we define &'/23 as









Table 1 about here6
'HYLDWLRQIURP/23 For the full sample (214 observations), the average '/23
is 1.01 with a standard deviation of 5.22 such that a two-tailed t-test rejects the null hypothesis
of zero deviation (t=2.83, which is significant at the 1 percent level). An average deviation
from LOP of one percent can not, however, be taken as evidence of systematic price
discrimination over the entire period, in particular since the period contains both large
negative and positive deviations from LOP. The average absolute value deviation, _'/23|, is
4.29, which suggests that in most months there are considerable violations of LOP. At this
stage, it would be easy to conclude that the fixed costs of printing new catalogues and
adjusting nominal prices are alone responsible for the deviations from LOP. This, however, is
not the complete story as, for example, five new catalogues were printed between 1982 and
1988, each time conserving the relative price.
Although LOP is statistically rejected it remains a useful guiding principle for
understanding the development of the relative price: Birka Line adjusts its relative price when
the deviation from LOP becomes too large. This is evidenced in the last three columns in
Table 1. Conditioning on the type of month, we find that when relative prices are adjusted the
average _'/23| is 2.22 - lower than the other columns. The average _'/23_ the month prior
to an adjustment of the relative price is 7.21 (not shown in Table 1). The averages of |&'/23|
give further indication of Birka Line’s desire to reduce deviations from LOP. In particular, had
it not adjusted relative prices when it did, the deviation would have been 8.36. In contrast
when new catalogues were issued in which the relative price was unchanged the average
|&'/23| was only 3.87.
  It is common in the literature (see, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, 1996) to test for a unit
root in deviations from LOP (or purchasing power parity, PPP).
6 The presence of a unit root,
such that the relative price follows a random walk, would suggest that there is no equalizing
pressure from arbitrage. The simplest test, in our setting, amounts to an AR(1) specification
with the deviation, T, defined as  ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( / ),0 6(. ),0 6(. 3 3 H + - . While keeping in mind all
the potential problems in tests for unit roots, the simple AR(1) regression on our data will
allow a comparison with studies that employ aggregate data. We thus estimate
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  where a=0 and b<1 if LOP is exerting an influence on the relative price. Based on 214
monthly observations, the least squares estimates are a=-0.000570 (0.00124) and b=0.971
(0.0236), with standard errors in parentheses (D-W=2.14 and adj.R
2=0.88). With a test
statistic of -1.43, against a critical Dickey-Fuller value of -2.57 at the 10 percent level, it
cannot be rejected that deviations from LOP follow a random walk.
  Given that the estimated b is less than unity, it is interesting to calculate the
implied half-life of a deviation from LOP (Q months defined by b
Q￿= 0.5). The half-life is 24
months, compared to the 3-5 years commonly found in studies that employ aggregate data (for
references, see Rogoff, 1996).
7 A half-life of two years remains long, but can be related to
Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor’s (1997) explanation of the apparently weak equalizing
pressure from arbitrage. Their argument is that arbitrage only occurs when deviations from
LOP are sufficiently large, and, consequently, there is a 'band of inaction' where small
deviations can persist. In terms of the results from the AR(1) model above, there are many
periods where deviations are too small to induce arbitrage, which explains the long half-life,
but when deviations occasionally move outside the band of inaction the adjustment is rapid.
At Birka Line, LOP almost never holds exactly and there are only eight, out of 214, months
when the firm acts to reduce deviations. To put it another way, Birka Line keeps the relative
price constant for an average of 28 months (the duration differs between one and 64 months).
Corresponding to this are long periods when the deviation stays either positive or negative, on
average 24 months but lasting up to 112 months between October 1981 and February 1991.
However, when deviations become too large the firm adjusts relative prices.
  6(.),0: The most important explanation of why relative prices are not
adjusted in each new catalogue can be seen by comparing | 3 / = D 0 H ),0 6(. |, i.e. the absolute
value of the percentage movement in  ),0 6(. H /  since the last catalogue with new relative
prices, in columns M=2 and M=3. When a new catalogue with unchanged relative price
appears (M=2), the drift in H6(.￿),0 has been a moderate 2.5 percent, compared to the rather
dramatic 7.5 percent when the relative prices are revised. Hence, small movements in the
H6(.￿),0 do not motivate any change in the relative price.
  <86' By comparing  | 3 or    2 | / = = D 0 0 H 86’ <  for Y=SEK,FIM in the last
three columns we conclude that before a new catalogue is issued there have been large
changes (between 8 and 15 percent) in the exchange rates against the US dollar (USD) (the
results are similar for British pounds and French francs) since the last new catalogue. Since8
the products sold by Birka Line are typically imports, this is evidence of delayed pass-through
into consumer prices. (The very large means in column M=3 are partly due to devaluations
that also triggered adjustments of relative prices.)
  ,QIODWLRQ Inflation (D&3,) in Sweden and Finland makes the nominal prices
outdated and induces the firm to print a new catalogue. Still, despite annual inflation
averaging 8 percent in both countries over the period, the firm only issues 26 catalogues.
Before a new catalogue (with or without new relative prices) is issued, inflation has eroded
prices by an average of more than seven percent - evidence of substantial nominal rigidities.
  7D[HV More than half of the catalogues are published in January, June and July.
This may partly reflect a time dependent pattern in the appearance of new catalogues – but
also the fact that new taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, two important product groups, are often
effective from 1 January and 1 July.
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  The ferry operator Viking Line also sets prices in SEK and FIM and uses the same relative
price for all goods. Again, there are infrequent price adjustments and therefore deviations
from LOP - on average 1.82 (standard deviation 6.92 with 78 observations). A two-tailed t-
test rejects LOP at the 5 percent level (t=2.31). The average |'/23| is 5.78 (standard
deviation 4.29); when a new catalogue is issued it reduces the average |'/23| to 3.71 from
10.6 the month before. Relative prices are held constant for periods between nine and sixteen
months. Some differences between Viking Line and Birka Line, such as larger deviations on
the former and that Viking Line always adjusts relative prices when new catalogues are
printed (except on one occasion when '/23 is small), may be attributed to the higher
exchange rate variability during the period covered by the Viking Line data. Nevertheless,
much of the pattern of relative price adjustment is the same as on Birka Line.
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  The airline SAS sets prices in USD as well as in the Scandinavian currencies (DKK:
Denmark, NOK: Norway, and SEK). Pricing behavior on SAS differs in some respects from
that of the ferry lines. The most important difference is that it does not use the same relative9
price for all products. Hence, deviations from LOP will differ across products. In Table 2 we
summarize average '/23 for some products in different price ranges.
 
  Table 2 about here
 
  Clearly, in several cases the null hypothesis, that '/23 , is rejected. Prices are frequently
adjusted, so that the rejection can not be ascribed to fixed nominal prices in the respective
currencies. Take Marlboro cigarettes as an example. The average deviation from LOP in SEK
and DKK is -7.8 percent (the average absolute deviation, |'/23|, is 9.5). The nominal SEK
and DKK prices were adjusted 8 and 7 times, respectively, which led to 11 adjustments of the
relative price during the 39 months between January 1995 and March 1998. After the relative
price was adjusted the average '/23 was -4.6 percent (with an average |'/23| of 6.9). Since
deviations were lower after adjustment than the average deviation, SAS like the other firms,
acts to reduce large deviations from LOP.
  One expects rules of thumb (such as "pay in your own currency") to become less
important as amounts increase. When buying a Mont Blanc pen for USD 138, many travelers
might find it worthwhile to consider the relative prices. On the other hand, a consumer buying
a carton of Marlboro cigarettes for USD 22 may assume that the difference is too small to
motivate the effort. There is some evidence of this. A comparison of the SEK price of the two
most expensive items - the Eurosleeper (an upgrade to a reclining seat) and the Mont Blanc
pen - with the DKK and NOK prices reveals average deviations of less than 2.5 percent. The
cheaper products tend to have greater deviations.
  It is worth noting that paying in USD is more expensive for all the products in
Table 2. The average deviation from LOP over the period was almost 10 percent for the
Eurosleeper. One could conjecture that customers paying in USD are less informed about the





  Following the tradition of previous work on deviations from LOP and purchasing power
parity, we have measured deviations from LOP using a monthly financial exchange rate.
Given that rates fluctuate daily, our measure may understate the arbitrage opportunities that10
arise within a month. However, except for months with currency devaluations, the variation
within a month is quite modest. More important is that as soon as there are costs of arbitrage
there will be a band of inaction within which the deviation from LOP can fluctuate before
arbitrage becomes profitable. These transaction costs will differ across consumers: many will
exchange currency at home in preparation for a trip abroad, some choose to exchange on
board, while others are returning home and are holding foreign currency that they would like
to spend. Further, if payment is by credit card, the issuing bank will typically use the exchange
rate a couple of days hence. It proved impossible to acquire historical information about these
transaction costs. Nevertheless, some indication of the potential importance can be gained by
examining the current spreads. Figure 2 illustrates the deviations from LOP on Viking Line
with the arbitrage costs implied by the spreads on the exchange rate from 10 November 1999,
in the exchange booth on Viking Line and at the largest retail foreign exchange dealer in
Stockholm, Forex. The rates for credit cards are similar to those at Forex.
8
 
  Figure 2 about here
 
Figure 2 shows that deviations greater than the bands implied by of the on-
board transaction costs were short-lived. This pattern is consistent with the notion that costs of
exchanging money on board are an important barrier to arbitrage. It is also consistent with the
fact that the ferry lines use the same relative price for all goods, since if costs of exchange are
the main friction, the equalizing pressure should be independent of the price of the good.
However, actual transaction costs can not explain the pattern since the deviation
from LOP is almost always outside the bands implied by the on-shore (credit card) transaction
cost. Catalogues are available at several locations on shore (for example, at the Viking Line
ticket office at the Stockholm central railway station, where there is also a Forex exchange
booth), so, theoretically, price comparisons can be made and arbitrage is often possible with
the on-shore exchange rates. One interpretation is that not only actual transaction costs but
also costs of optimizing play a role in allowing deviations from LOP. The tendencies for
prices on SAS to be closer to LOP for expensive goods, and for USD prices to be higher, are
also consistent with rule of thumb behavior. Transaction costs and costs of optimizing thus
create a band of inaction, where arbitrage does not exert any equalizing pressure, in the range
of 5-10 percent. Since there are also transport costs associated with essentially any other11
arbitrage of goods by consumers, the bands of inaction should be wider for other goods in this
price range.
9
Are consumers taking advantage of the deviations from LOP? Unfortunately, no
firm was willing to provide detailed statistics on the currency distribution of revenue, but in
interviews both ferry lines clearly stated that the share of customers shopping in each currency
is quite stable. Swedes shop in SEK and Finns in FIM. Evidence to support this comes from
the 1993 bankruptcy of Rederi AB Slite, one of the owners of Viking Line. Slite filed for
bankruptcy in April but until 1 January 1994 one of the ferries (Kalypso) continued to operate
under the Viking Line flag. The bankruptcy files include accounting information from this
ferry for the last month. In this month it was 7.6 percent cheaper to buy in SEK using the IFS
exchange rate. Nevertheless, cash revenue from on-board sales denominated in FIM amounted
to FIM 9.5 million (or about SEK 13.6 million) whereas sales in SEK were some SEK 10
million. Hence, even though it was cheaper to buy in SEK, 73 percent of the revenue was in
FIM during this month. In fact, this number corresponds closely to the approximately 70
percent of travelers that Viking Line said were Finnish. This is perhaps not very surprising as
a traveler who buys a USD 100 bundle (who can be thought of as a representative consumer)
would save no more than USD 6 with the on-shore exchange rate.
Some indirect evidence that consumers do take advantage of arbitrage
opportunities when deviations from LOP become large comes from the fact that Birka Line
stopped the practice of dual currency price setting in 1992, when the floating of the SEK led
to increased volatility of H6(.￿),0. The service motive for dual currency pricing had also
gradually lost importance, as the fraction of Finnish customers dwindled from almost 50
percent in 1975 to only 5-10 percent in 1992. Higher volatility increased arbitrage
opportunities and Birka Line deemed that it was not in their best interest to continue the
policy. As of today, it is still possible to pay in FIM but prices are quoted only in SEK and
converted at the current exchange rate. At Viking Line, however, the more even mix of Finns
and Swedes throughout the period 1991-1998 made it attractive to keep the dual currency
price setting also in the period of floating exchange rates. Another indication of arbitrage at
work is that both ferry lines mentioned that frequent travelers tended to shop in the currently
favorable currency. Presumably, these travelers hold both currencies and are able to quickly
compare the relative prices with the current exchange rate. Interestingly, both ferry lines
claimed that a major motivation for limiting the deviations from LOP was that customers from
one country complain that prices are lower in the other currency. The risk of damaging12
customer relations by not treating each one “fairly” was seen as a significant risk. This
suggests that, in addition to opportunities for consumer arbitrage, there are other factors (such
as reputational concerns) that should be taken into account when discussing why LOP holds,





  It is well established that for a wide range of goods, national markets are not integrated in the
sense that LOP does not hold (see e.g. Rogoff, 1996 and Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). This is
starkly illustrated in Charles Engel and John Rogers (1996) who show that the variability of
relative prices, controlling for geographical distance, is far higher if the locations are in
different countries. While often difficult to control for empirically, factors such as trade
barriers and differences in product specifications, service levels, warranties and costs of local
inputs can explain why some prices are different across the border. The evidence from
Scandinavian duty-free outlets shows that LOP may fail even when the same product is
available at the same location only because it is priced in different currencies.
  One reason for the violations of LOP is that, because of differences in demand
or costs across markets, optimal prices differ between locations. Costs of arbitrage give firms
a certain degree of freedom to allow prices to differ across markets. For example, a recent
study by Goldberg and Verboven (1998) of international price discrimination in European car
markets shows that, after controlling for differences in product specifications, the substantial
price differentials can be attributed to local costs and, to a lesser extent, to price
discrimination. A number of transport and information costs are typically associated with
conducting arbitrage. Although the consumers in the duty-free stores know the nominal prices
in several currencies and face no transport costs, there are still some costs of arbitrage that
prevent them from fully taking advantage of the deviations. There is thus some substance to
the argument that costs of exchanging currency and costs of comparing prices make possible
some degree of price discrimination when prices are expressed in different currencies. It is,
however, likely that these costs are small in relation to transport and other information costs
for most consumer goods.
  Another explanation for the observed deviations from LOP is that they are a
byproduct of price rigidities and fluctuations in exchange rates. That nominal prices are rigid13
is well established - for recent studies see Kashyap (1995) and Saul Lach and Daniel Tsiddon
(1996); Taylor (1999) provides a survey. Nominal price rigidities coupled with international
markets relate our work to Michael M. Knetter (1997) and Atish Ghosh and Holger C. Wolf
(1994). They examine the cover prices of the magazine 7KH (FRQRPLVW and attribute a
significant portion of deviations from LOP to the fact that nominal prices are adjusted
infrequently. In a recent study, Johnathan Haskel and Holger C. Wolf (1999) examine
catalogue prices from the furniture retailer IKEA and also find substantial deviations from
LOP. What distinguishes our study from these is the local cost component of products and the
potential for arbitrage. The cost of the product to the duty-free outlet is independent of the
currency in which the consumer chooses to pay, but for magazines and furniture the local
costs are likely to differ across countries. As regards arbitrage, in the duty-free outlet the
consumer can choose the currency of payment, subject to some transaction costs, whereas
arbitrage of magazines or furniture is hindered by several additional factors. The rejection of
LOP at the duty-free outlets suggest that nominal rigidities are important for deviations from
LOP.
  We also showed that, even in this simple setting, the estimated half-lifes of
deviations from LOP are of similar length as in the previous studies of deviations from LOP
and purchasing power parity surveyed by Rogoff (1996). One reason for why long half-lifes
can be compatible with relatively low costs of arbitrage has been proposed by Obstfeld and
Taylor (1997). Their argument is that arbitrage costs create a band of inaction within which
relative prices can move without any equalizing pressure from arbitrage. Our data showed if
the deviation from LOP was small, the relative price was indeed kept constant. During these,
sometimes long, periods deviations followed a random walk. To larger deviations, however,
firms responded by adjusting relative prices to restore LOP. Thus, the band of inaction was
found to account for both long half-lifes and rapid adjustment to large exchange rate
movements.14
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7DEOH Descriptive statistics for Birka Line.
Full sample. Months when no new
catalogue appeared, (M=1).
Months when new ca
































































































Number of observations 214 195 1118
7DEOH Deviations from the Law of One Price at the SAS inflight shop.





Marlboro 23.7 -7.8*** 1.3 6.2***
(7.1) (5.3) (7.6)
Mont Blanc Ballpoint Pen 138 -0.4 1.4 6.2***
(3.7) (5.1) (7.4)
Eurosleeper 551 1.1* 2.2*** 9.3***
(3.7) (4.2) (8.6)
Renault Carte Noir 24.5 -6.7*** -2.7*** 1.9*
(5.4) (4.0) (6.3)
Absolut Airborn 2*20cl 14.4 -0.3 4.7*** 13.2***
(3.3) (4.5) (7.3)
Arden, Visible Difference 48.7 -2.8*** -2.5*** 1.5
(4.6) (4.5) (7.5)
***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10, percent level, respectively.
a) The number of observations vary with product and column: Marlboro, Eurosleeper, Renault Carte Noir and
Arden Visible Difference: 39 observations in the second column, 39 in the third column and 32 in the last
column. For Mont Blanc ballpoint pen the corresponding number of observations are 33, 33, and 32. For Absolut
Airborn the number of observations are 29 in all the columns.
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Figure 1. Nominal prices in SEK (3 SEK) and FIM (3 FIM) of Marlboro cigarettes on Birk
















































Figure 2. Deviations from LOP and no-arbitrage bounds implied by costs of currency exchange. 















’/23 SEK/FIM On-shore transaction costs On-board transaction costs21
$SSHQGL[$ List of products.
Product name Specification Duty free shop(s)
$OFRKRO
Absolut Vodka, 1 liter 50%  a) B,V,S
Finlandia Vodka, 1 liter 50%  a) B,V
Smirnoff Vodka, 1 liter 50 % B,V
J&B Whisky, 1 liter B,V
Ballentines Whisky, 1 liter B
Johnnie Walker Red Label Whisky, 1 liter B
Renault Carte Noire Conjac, 1 liter S
Le Cardinal Red Bordeux, 1liter B
Carlsberg Elephant Beer, 6*0.33 liter B
Heineken Beer, 6*0.33 liter V
7REDFFR
Marlboro Filter Cigarettes, 200 psc B,V,S
Ettan Snuff, 50 gram B,V
&RVPHWLFV
Chanel No. 5 Perfume, 7.5ml B
Tabac Orginal After Shave, 175ml B
Arden Visible Difference Lotion S
Boss Elements Duopack Aftershave+Deodorant S
2WKHU
Eurosleeper Seat upgrade S
Mont Blanc Ballpoint Pen S
In the third column B denotes that the good is available at Birka Line, S at SAS and
V at Viking Line.
a) At Viking Line the product contains 40% alcohol. At SAS Absolut is 2*20 cl
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1 This is under the assumption that the SEK/FIM exchange rate follows a random walk with no drift. In practice,
however, the exchange rate might well exhibit a mean reverting element as the two economies are closely linked.22
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For more on decision rules for such more complex processes (e.g. with drift and mean reversion) see Avinash K.
Dixit and Robert Pindyck (1994).
2 We are grateful to Nils-Ole Isakas, Viking Line, Agnetha Wigren and Stig Wilhelmson, SAS, and Bengt
Carlström, Birka Line, for providing the data (available from the authors upon request). Parts of the current price
lists are available on the Internet: http://www.scandinavian.net, http://www.vikingline.se (prices in SEK) and
http://www.vikingline.fi (prices in FIM).
3 In fact, a more detailed examination of the distribution of price adjustments reveals striking similarities with
what Anil K. Kashyap (1995) reported for US mail order catalogues for outdoor products (which are imported
from various countries, as are the products in the duty-free outlets). For instance, Kashyap finds that a price, on
average, is kept fixed for 12 months and the average adjustment is 8 percent; about 8 percent of price changes are
negative. At Birka, for the 12 products in our sample, prices are fixed on average 11 months and the average
adjustment in SEK is 8.5 percent; in 7 percent of the cases the SEK price is reduced.
4 Due to tick-size effects, there are a few more relative price changes on products with low nominal prices. The
impact on results is minor. With Marlboro cigarettes, for example, there are two more changes in relative price
than for Smirnoff. First prices change from SEK 26 and FIM 22 (36(./3),0=1.182) to SEK 30 and FIM 25.5
(36(./3),0=1.176), and from this to SEK 35 and FIM 30 (36(./3),0=1.167). More expensive products, such as
Smirnoff vodka, had their relative price unchanged at 1.176.
5 We use this measure since we employ end-of-the month exchange rates and we know only the month (not the
date) when a new catalogue is issued. For example, at the end of August 1981 the SEK/FIM exchange rate was
1.145 and 36(./3),0 =1.11. Sweden devalued the following month, which resulted in an exchange rate of 1.249
in late September. Birka immediately responded to this with a new catalogue with 36(./3 ),0 =1.25. Hence,
'/23[August]=3.06 and '/23[September]=-0.09, respectively. Had Birka not issued a new catalogue it would
have had '/23 of 12.4 in September (i.e. &'/23[September]=12.4).
6 The high correlation between real and nominal exchange rates has been the subject of much research. Using
price indexes, Charles Engel (1999) concludes that a very large share of real exchange rate variability can be
explained by the failure of LOP for traded goods. However, prices of traded goods may contain significant non-
traded inputs. The Birka line data are clearly consistent with the notion that deviations from LOP for traded
goods are important for PPP deviations. The correlation between the SEK/FIM real exchange rate using CPIs and
the "real exchange rate" using Birka prices instead of CPIs is 0.71.
7 One could argue that LOP should be tested and half-lifes calculated using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
(including more lags of T in Equation 3). LOP is rejected also with this test. Using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test (with lag length 4 months) yields a half-life of 44 months when using the first order coefficient. Estimating
half-lifes using impulse response functions, as discussed in Christian J. Murray and David H. Papell (2000),
yields lower half-lifes than the simple AR(1) specification.
8 Forex bought FIM 1 for SEK 1.4301 and sold for SEK 1.4746. This implies arbitrage costs of 1.4746-
(1.4301+1.4706)/2 = 0.02225 SEK in each direction, or 1.53 percent. The rates offered by the banks on sales of
currency are similar to those offered by Forex. For instance, MeritaNordbanken, one of the largest banks bought
FIM for 1.431218 and sold for 1.47446 both for cash and for credit card purchases that were booked on this date.23
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The corresponding rates in the on-board exchange booth were 1.34 and 1.56, implying a transaction cost of 7.58
percent.
9 The costs of exchanging currency are, of course, of relatively less importance for large commercial transactions
where the bands are much narrower. For instance, on 11 November 1999, SEB (a major Swedish bank) quoted
1.431218 and 1.476446 for "tourists" but 1.452218 (buy) and 1.458946 (sell) for commercial transactions,
corresponding to a band of 0.4 percent.
10 A case in point comes from prices of cars in the UK - large and persistent price differentials between UK and
continental Europe are well established (see Penelopi K. Goldberg and Frank Verboven, 1998, or the bi-annual
price comparisons made by the European Commission). Parallel imports remain comparatively small but calls for
consumer boycott and investigations by competitive authorities are highly visible responses to the deviations
from LOP (see for instance The Financial Times, 3 December 1999, UK pricing review: Facing the flak from
inquiry).